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ABSTRACT
The appointment of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court in 2009 was
criticized as sacrificing merit on the altar of identity politics. According to
critics, Sotomayor was simply "not that smart. "For some conservative critics,
her selection illustrated the costs of affirmative action policies, in that this
particular choice was going to produce a lower quality Supreme Court. For
liberal critics, many were concerned that the President, by selecting
Sotomayor, was squandering an opportunity to appoint an intellectual
counterweight to conservative Justices like Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, and
John Roberts. Using a set of basic measures of judicial merit, such as
publication and citation rates for the years 2004 to 2006, when Sotomayor was
on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we compare her performance
to that of her colleagues on the federal appeals courts. Sotomayor matches up
well. She might turn out to be more of a force on the Court than the naysayers
predicted.
1. "NOT NEARLY AS SMART AS SHE SEEMS TO THINK SHE IS"
When President Barack Obama was considering whether to nominate to the
Supreme Court Sonia Sotomayor, then a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, a prominent law professor, Laurence Tribe,
wrote a letter to the President opposing Sotomayor's potential nomination on
the ground that "she's not nearly as smart as she seems to think she is." While
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1 Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Barack
Obama, U.S. President (May 4, 2009), available at http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20101028 tribeletter.pdf. For
a discussion of the Tribe letter, see Ed Whelan, Tribe to Obama: Sotomayor Is "Not Nearly as Smart as She
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Tribe's assessment was intended as a private communication, others were
saying something similar in public. 2 Jeffrey Rosen, another legal academic,
wrote an article in the New Republic questioning Sotomayor's merit. 3 Based on
anonymous sources, Rosen reported that there was widespread skepticism
among the judges and academics familiar with Sotomayor's work regarding
her capabilities for the job.4 The consistent theme was a concern that
Sotomayor was simply "not that smart."5 Even those on the Democratic side of
the aisle, Rosen noted, appeared to have misgivings about Sotomayor's
intellectual capabilities.
6
It was not long before the conventional narrative became that Sotomayor
was a mediocre legal mind . Commentators accused President Obama of
having sacrificed merit for identity politics ("biography over brain," in the
words of Washington Post commentator, Dana Milbank). 8 For many, she was
not in the pool of the best qualified candidates, even if it was the case that
Obama wanted to pick a female Justice.9 There were others, such as Diane
Wood, a former law professor at the University of Chicago and judge on the
Seventh Circuit, and Elena Kagan, the former dean of the Harvard Law School
and, at the time, Solicitor General of the United States, whom they thought
were smarter and more deserving. 10 While supporters of Wood and Kagan
Seems to Think She Is," NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 28, 2010, 9:42 AM), http://www.nationalreview.coin/
bench-memos/251301 /tribe-obama-sotomayor-not-nearly-smart-she-seems-think-she-ed-whelan.
2 See Countdown with Keith Olberman (MSNBC television broadcast May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.msnbc msn.com/id/3036677/vp/30950928#30950928 (interviewing Jonathan Turley, Professor,
George Washington University), P.J. Gladnick, Liberal Jonathan Turley: Sotomayor Lacks Intellectual Depth,
NEWSBUSTERS (May 27, 2009), http://newsbusters.orgblogs/p--gladnick/2009/05/27/liberal-jonathan-turley-
sotomayor-lacks-intellectual-depth (quoting Turley as characterizing Sotomayor as lacking "intellectual depth"
but describing Diane Wood as "blazingly brilliant").
3 Jefirey Rosen, The Case Against Sotomayor: Indictments of Obama's Front-Runner to Replace Souter,
NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://wwwtnrcol-n/article/politics/the-case-against-sotomayor
4 ld.
5 Id. (quoting a former Second Circuit clerk) (internal quotation mark omitted).
6 ld.
7 See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Op-Ed., The So-So Sotomayor, WASH. POST, July 21,2009, at A17.
8 See Dana Milbank, Op-Ed, Washington Sketch: But Will She Suit Up with the Washington Nine?,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2009, at A2; see also Ilya Shapiro, Commentaty: Sotomayor Pick Not Based on Merit,
CNN (May 27, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-05-27/politics/shapiro.scotus.identity ljudge-sotomayor-
hispanic-supreme-court-sonia-sotomayor?sPM:POLITICS.
9 See Milbank, supra note 8.
1o Sharon Johnson, Wood, Kagan Are on High Court Short List, Again, WOMEN'S ENEWS (Apr. 25,
2010), http://wonmensenews.org/story/in-the-courts/100423/wood-kagan-are-high-court-short-list-again; see
also Milbank, supra note 8; Shapiro, supra note 8.
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often depicted them as brainy or brilliant, some of Sotomayor's supporters
described her as workmanlike and competent.
11
To us, a striking aspect of Sotomayor's nomination was that this public and
negative assessment of her merit was made without much factual support. One
might even argue that the initial presumption should have been in her favor.
After all, she graduated with honors from Princeton University, graduated from
Yale Law School, and spent more than a decade on the court of appeals,
following stints as a trial judge and a federal prosecutor. 12 It is hard to look at
her credentials and conclude reflexively that she was unqualified for the
Supreme Court-that is, unless one applied a high discount to her
achievements on the theory that her success was largely attributable to
affirmative action.13 A theme running through much of the public discussion of
her candidacy was that this appointment, more than most, represented the
triumph of identity politics over merit. 14 One could not escape the fact that she
was going be the first Latina on the Supreme Court or that President Obama
had considered and nominated her in part because she was Latina.
15
Our goal in this Essay is to provide some data against which to test the
claims of Sotomayor's mediocrity. Prior to being nominated to the Court, she
had been a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for roughly a
decade. 16 The pool of judges on the courts of appeals is the primary one from
which Supreme Court Justices are chosen these days. 17 That means that we
should be able to compare Sotomayor's performance to that of her peers to get
a rough sense of just how she matches up.
We use two categories of measures to evaluate Sotomayor's performance
relative to that of all the other active judges on the courts of appeals over the
period from 2004 to 2006. The categories are publications and citations. As we
explain in the next section, the thirteen different measures we use within those
1 See Kristina Moore, Over 1000 Law Professors Join Letter Endorsing Sotomayor, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 8, 2009, 1:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog com/2009/07/over-1000-law-professors-join-letter-endorsing-
sotomayor/; see also Cohen, suipra note 7; Milbank, supra note 8.
12 Press Release, White House, Background on Judge Sonia Sotomnayor (May 26, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/.
13 See Joe Conason, Sonia Sotomayor Is Not Clarence Thomas, SALON (May 29, 2009, 6:24 AM),
http://www salon.com/2009/05/29/clarence thomas 2/.
14 See Shapiro, suipra note 8.
5 See id.
16 Press Release, White House, supra note 12.
17 Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversiy
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903, 908-17 (2003).
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categories should give us a rough sense of the skill and effort that Judge
Sotomayor brought to her job, in comparison to her peers.
In constructing these comparisons to test claims that were made about
Sotomayor during her nomination, we are not writing on a blank slate. Other
scholars have subjected the repeated claims that were made about Sotomayor
being a "judicial activist" to empirical testing. 18 The claims were found
wanting. 19 And our analysis builds on a preliminary examination reported by
Professor Eric Posner in two blog posts in 2009.20 He compared Sotomayor's
performance on the appeals court to that of the ten other judges whose names
had been mentioned as potential candidates for the Court and found that she
did well. 21 We expand on that analysis in three ways: (1) by comparing
Sotomayor's numbers to the full set of 136 judges who were active during the
years from 2004 to 2006, (2) by using additional measures, and (3) by
controlling for structural differences across the federal circuits.
The question of how best to construct objective measures of judicial
performance has been the topic of considerable debate in recent years. 22 The
measures we use, citations and publications, are among the more familiar ones
in the literature. 23 We should note, though, that these measures have come in
18 See MONICA YouN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, JUDGE SOTOMAYOR's RECORD IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES, at v vi (2009); Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (2011); Marcia Coyle, No Activist Judge, Says
Nei Book, NAT'L L.J (June 8, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nti/legaltimes/PubArticleFriendlyLT.jsp?id-
1202431249312&slretum-1.
19 See YouN, supra note 18, at v-vi; Yung, supra note 18, at 42-43; Coyle, supra note 18.
20 See Eric Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor: What the Data Shoiw, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009,
11:40 AM), http://vololh.coin/posts/1242229209.shtml [hereinafter Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor]; Eric
Posner, Judge Sotomayor: More Data, and a New Conclusion, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 27, 2009, 11:50
PM), http://vololh.coln/archives/archive 2009 05 24-2009 05 30.shtml#1243482653 [hereinafter Posner,
Judge Sotomayor].
21 See Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 20; Posner, Judge Sotomayor, supra note 20. Posner's
analysis was done on the basis of data that were collected jointly with Stephen Choi and one of us, G. Mitu
Gulati. See Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 20; Posner, Judge Sotomayor, supra note 20. For a
report on that analysis, see Assessing Sotomayor's Influence, N.Y. TIvES, http://www.nytimes.coM!
interactive/2009/05/28/us/politics/0529-judge-graphic.html (last visited July 5, 2012).
22 For interested readers, these measures have been debated in a number of symposia. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005); Symposium,
Measuring Judges and Justices, 58 DUKE L.J 1173 (2009); Symposium, The Impact of Direct Democracy, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 835 (2005).
23 See Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 77 85 (2008); Stephen J.
Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge
Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 32-34 (2004) Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, "Followed Rates" and
Leading State Cases, 1940 2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 685 89 (2007); William M. Landes et al.,
Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-76
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24for their share of criticism and been subjected to testing. In addition,
commentators have proposed and utilized other measures as well. 25 We will
not rehash the debate here.
If Sotomayor's performance, while on the appeals court, had been
mediocre, we would expect to find that, in comparison to her peers, she would
have published few opinions and that those opinions would have had little
impact because they would not have often been cited by other judges and
commentators. If, on the other hand, she had performed with distinction, we
would expect to find that she does better than most of her colleagues in terms
of output and citations. The results suggest that Sotomayor compares well with
her peers. She is above the mean on all of our measures, in the top quarter of
all judges in the comparison pool on eleven of the thirteen measures, and in the
top 10% on seven of those thirteen measures.
11. A HIERARCHY OF MEASURES
Before proceeding, it may help to clarify what we are, and are not, claiming
to show. We are not challenging the merits of the reviews of Sotomayor by
Tribe, Rosen, or any of the others who either reviewed her opinions or
collected anonymous reports. We are offering a different measure by which
Sotomayor's merit might have been judged, one that we concede has value
primarily in terms of raising questions about the more sophisticated
evaluations done by others, such as Tribe and Rosen.
Our starting premise is that there are multiple methods by which to measure
an appellate judge's merit, vis-d-vis a possible elevation to the High Court. The
possible methods of evaluation all contain tradeoffs. Tribe's evaluation,
(1998); Russell Smyth & Mita Bhattacharya, What Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for
Judges of the Federal Court of Australia, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 233, 233 34 (2003).
24 See, e.g., Marin K. Levy et al., The Costs of Judging Judges by the Numbers, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 313, 314 15 (2010); William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Using
Empirical Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2004). For tests of the
measures, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of
Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (2008); and Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Howi Well Do
Measures of Ability Predict Judicial Performance?: A Case Study Using Securities Class Actions (Univ. of
Chi. Law Sch., Olin Research Paper No. 519, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id-1596910.
25 See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009); Dear &
Jessen, supra note 23; Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1175 (2005); Smyth & Bhattacharya, supra note 23.
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Rosen's evaluation, and our evaluation all fall into different boxes in terms of
using different methods to answer the same question.
The analogy to movie reviews may help. Someone interested in knowing
whether to go to a particular movie has a variety of sources of information on
that movie. One option is to look to the evaluations by Anthony Lane,
26
Manhola Dargis, 27 or one of the other critics for the New Yorker or the New
York Times. Here, the reviewers themselves are typically famous and conduct
nuanced and erudite reviews. Readers looking at these reviews know ahead of
time that what they are getting is likely to be idiosyncratic-indeed, that is part
of the value. Laurence Tribe's review of Sotomayor might be thought of as
falling into this category. It is a review done by a superstar academic who
likely brings his idiosyncratic preferences to the table. At least a portion of
those reading his review (and certainly, his former student, Barack Obama) are
going to be able to read it in the context of who he is, what his preferences and
motives are, and so on.
For a different category of views, our potential moviegoer might look
28 29online at Rotten Tomatoes or Fandango for aggregations of what are likely
pseudonymous and perhaps less expert movie reviews. Here, one often will not
have any idea who the reviewers are, what their motivations are, and so on
(they could be jealous competitors, fawning acolytes, or seven-year-olds from
Kazakhstan). The fact of the reviewers' anonymity has upsides and downsides.
On the one hand, it allows for more honesty (no fear of repercussion from the
author or her friends), and on the other hand, it allows for more dishonesty (no
fear of reputational loss if it turns out that there is widespread disagreement
with the content of the review). Rosen's review, relying on anonymous
sources, might be thought of as falling into this category. It provides a different
type of information than the superstar review, but one that is just as legitimate
and perhaps more relevant to some audiences.
Third, and perhaps less sophisticated, is market information. The potential
moviegoer may want to know whether the movie is popular-whether this is a
movie that appeals to the broader public. If one is interested, one could even
26 Contributors: Anthony Lane, NEW YORKER, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/bios/anthony lane/
search'contributorName-anthony%201ane (last visited July 5, 2012).
27 Manohla Dargis, N.Y. TIvEs, http://movies.nytimes.com/movies/critics/Manohla-Dargis (last visited
July 5, 2012).
28 ROTTEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentoinatoes.com/ (last visited July 5, 2012).
29 FANDANGO, http://www.fandango.coin/ (last visited July 5, 2012).
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break down the market statistics in terms of which specific markets the movie
has done well in. The fact that a movie has done well in Madison, Wisconsin,
but terribly in Cochin, India, conveys more information (if one knows anything
about the audience preferences in those two locations) than simply knowing
that the movie did well in Madison.
Our data on Sotomayor is like the market information about her
performance. It is less nuanced than the above-mentioned sources, but it has a
greater level of objectivity and can be more easily verified. To the extent our
findings point in the same direction as those of Tribe and Rosen, that should
add to the level of confidence that one has in any of the evaluations. However,
if the three sources do not line up as pointing in the same direction, that should
raise questions. Whatever we find though, we cannot claim to be proving the
others wrong. We are simply adding more information to the mix.
III. THE DATA
To examine Sotomayor's performance relative to her colleagues on the
federal appeals courts, we collected data from roughly the middle of her tenure
on the Second Circuit. Her full first year on the Second Circuit was in 1999,
and her last full year on the Second Circuit, prior to nomination, was in 2008.
30
We examine her performance during three years falling roughly within the
middle of that period, from 2004 until 2006. Our reasons for selecting these
years were simple. We did not wish to look too early in her tenure, when she
might have been learning the job and building a reputation. During this period,
her numbers might have been biased downwards as a result of her inexperience
and lack of a reputation. We also did not want to look too late in her tenure,
when her name had begun surfacing as a possible candidate for elevation to the
Supreme Court by President Obama. During this latter period, her citation
numbers may have been biased upwards by an anticipatory Supreme Court
halo effect. That is, others citing her to invoke the extra authority that comes
from citing a possible Supreme Court Justice.
For the period from 2004 until 2006, we collected information at the
individual case level on every case that was published for twelve circuit courts
of general jurisdiction. We skipped the Federal Circuit because of its
specialized caseload. We should note at the outset, though, that there is
variation among the circuits in terms of caseloads and case types. For example,
30 See Press Release, White House, supra note 12.
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the D.C. Circuit's diet of cases is much higher in administrative law than the
Fifth Circuit. 31 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit likely sees many more immigration
cases than the Eighth Circuit. 32 Despite the variation in case types and
caseloads across circuits, there is reason to think that judicial performances can
be compared across the different federal courts. This is because our primary
comparison metric derives from the choice made by individual judges to
publish opinions. Two facts are important here. First, federal appellate judges,
regardless of circuit, face hundreds, if not thousands, of cases every year.
Many are easy and do not raise important legal issues. But there is also an
abundance of cases that potentially do raise important legal issues, and judges
do not have enough time to deal with all of them with published opinions
(there is now a large literature discussing this problem). Second, and relatedly,
judges tend to publish only a small fraction of their cases. Some judges publish
no more than a dozen opinions a year out of the hundreds that come before
them. Therefore, if one assumes that every judge, regardless of circuit, gets
more than enough cases that have issues that could be publication worthy, one
can compare judges in terms of their published opinions.
To make adjustments for variations in case types, we also collected
information for every case on the subject area that it fit under. The estimation
of whether a case fell within a given subject area was necessarily a subjective
one. The designation was made based on a combination of reading the
Westlaw summary of the case and examining the Westlaw KeyCites that
categorize every case as a function of the various subject areas that it covers. In
total, we coded the cases as falling into twenty-one distinct subject areas, plus
33one general category for "other" cases.
We report on data for 136 circuit court judges for the twelve circuits
mentioned above. 34 These were all the judges who were on active status for the
three years for which we collected data. Judges who were active for only a
subset of the period did not get counted. The "active" designation means that
the judge was taking a full caseload and had full administrative responsibilities
31 M. Wood, D.C. Circuit Has Special History Among Appeals Courts, Roberts Says, VA. L. (Apr. 26,
2005), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2005_spr/roberts.htm.
32 See ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERiCAN COURTS 28 (2010).
33 The list of subject areas is reported infra Appendix B.
34 There are 179 active positions on the federal courts of appeals. All of those positions, however, are not
necessarily filled at any given time How the Federal Courts Are Organized, FED. JUD. CENTER
http://www.fIc.gov/federal/courts.nsftautoframe?OpenForm&nav-menu3c&page-/federal/courts.nsf/page/A7
8301 lAF949B6BF85256B35004AD214opendocu1nent (last visited July 5, 2012).
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(the alternative is senior status, where the judge can reduce his caseload to as
low as 25% of the full load). 35 Our reason for focusing on the active judges is
that our numbers are most illustrative in a relative, rather than absolute, sense
because what we are interested in is Sotomayor's performance relative to that
of her competitors for the top spot. We restrict the comparison to her active
peers because that presumably constitutes a significant fraction of the pool of
competitors for the slot on the Supreme Court. The comparison pool we have
constructed is both under- and over-inclusive in terms of capturing the true
pool of Sotomayor's competitors vis-A-vis President Obama. On the minus
side, Obama's pool likely did not include most Republican-appointed judges
and judges above a certain age. On the plus side, Obama's pool surely included
some who were not federal appeals court judges (senior government officials,
academics, state judges, etc.). Our goal, though, is not to test whether Obama
picked the best candidate but rather to examine the hypothesis that his desire to
further diversity goals led him to pick a mediocre candidate. For purposes of
that hypothesis, comparing Sotomayor's performance to a pool of candidates
within which the candidates range from mediocre to exceptional should
suffice. Recent history suggests that most nominations to the Court tend to be
from the federal appeals courts, making it a reasonable comparison pool.
36
Our analysis has little to say about an individual judge's absolute merit.
What we have are measures of relative performance. For example, saying that
a judge publishes one hundred opinions a year does not tell us much about her
effort levels unless one also sees that 25% of the appellate judges publish
fewer than ten opinions a year.
Authorship: Here, we collected information on the identity of the writing
judge and the identities of the two other judges on the panel. These variables
allow us to determine both how many opinions Sotomayor authored and
published herself and how many "for publication" opinions she was on the
panel for. Prior research has tended to focus only on the primary author of the
opinion. And that may be reasonable, given that the primary author is the one
who generally puts in the major portion of the effort on any given opinion.
However, the end product is supposed to be the joint product of three judges.
Hence, the argument can be made that, when one observes that an opinion was
35 The assumption that senior judges do less work does not hold uniformly (in the course of this study,
we found indications that a few senior judges were producing as much, if not more, than some of their active
colleagues).
36 On the trend toward appointing federal appeals judges to the High Court, see Epstein et al., supra note
17, at 908-17.
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published or garnered a lot of citations, it is a team rather than individual effort
that one is observing. To take this team-production effect into account, we
attempt to estimate what the impact of Sotomayor sitting on a panel is, even
when she is not the primary author.
In terms of the specific characteristics of individual opinions, we also
measured the number of pages for each published opinion. The number of
pages provides a different measure of judicial effort than just a count of the
number of published opinions. Certain judges designate a large fraction of their
opinions as worthy of publication, and others are very judicious about such a
designation. The number of pages could simply indicate a long-winded style of
writing or may indicate how complex the issues were that the judge addressed.
Thus, this measure provides us with an additional, though different, measure of
judicial effort than the count of published opinions.
Citations: Citations to an opinion can come from a variety of different
audiences or users. Potentially, there is valuable information to be mined from
the fact that a certain judge is more or less popular with certain audiences.
Different audiences are likely to value different characteristics of a judicial
opinion. The fact that one audience likes an opinion a great deal and another
audience does not might provide information about the likely characteristics of
that opinion.
Take, for example, the complaint that judges and legal academics have
grown increasingly further apart in recent years. 3 7 In this story, academics are
more interested in interdisciplinary work that explores radical ideas, whereas
judges are more interested in careful doctrinal analyses. 38 Assuming the
foregoing, one would expect judges whose opinions are found more popular by
academics to be making more radical arguments, whereas judges whose
opinions are popular among other judges may be producing careful and
nuanced doctrinal syntheses. Finding out that Judge Sotomayor's opinions are
popular with academics but unpopular with her fellow judges might suggest
that her opinions are innovative but weak in terms of careful doctrinal parsing.
Along those lines, one might expect state judiciaries to be more interested
in opinions that tackle basic issues in areas that are more the province of state
laws-subjects such as torts, contracts, family law, and corporate law. A judge
37 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 57 (1992).
31 See id.
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who finds herself more cited by the state courts may be writing high-quality
opinions in the types of cases that fall under the purview of the local state
courts. One might also distinguish local citations (from courts that are required
to follow the decision as precedent) from outside circuit citations. A lot of
local citations probably mean that the judge writes opinions that state the local
law clearly. A lot of external citations may suggest something different-that
the opinions are helpful to other judges in their analyses.
As described above, we look to four separate audiences to count citations.
First, we examine citations by federal courts outside the circuit. Those are
federal courts where the opinion would have no precedential value but is
presumably cited because it helps the analysis. Second, we aggregate citations
within the circuit, where the citations are often going to be used, because the
opinion has precedential value. Third, we report citations from the state courts.
These are likely to be citations unrelated to the precedential effects of the case
because the state courts are not obligated to follow the federal courts in most
matters, especially those relating to state law. Fourth, we display citations by
legal academics in law journals and treatises.
For each of these citation measures, we used reports from the Shepard's
Citation Service. We counted citations for every published opinion issued
during the period from 2004 until 2006. The citations were tallied from the
date of publication until January 1, 2009. To avoid running into the halo effect
that might have impacted Sotomayor's circuit court opinions once her name
became actively discussed in the debates about whom President Obama might
nominate, we did not collect citations beyond that point.
39
One frequently discussed measure that we do not use is the rate at which
the Supreme Court reverses a judge. We do not use this measure for a couple
of reasons. First, the numbers on this measure tend to be quite small for any
given appeals court judge because the Supreme Court takes certiorari on only a
39 We are making an approximation here because Sotomayor's name was being actively discussed as a
possible candidate for the Court at least as early as October 2008. See Sarah Johnson, Granholn Placed on
Short List for Supreme Court Nomination, CENT. MICH. LIFE (Oct. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://wwv.cm-
life.con/2008/10/ 17/granholmplacedonshortlistforsupremecourtnomination/ (discussing Sonia Sotomayor as a
potential Supreme Court candidate), Justin Jouvenal, Ten Picks for Obama's Supreme Court, SALON (Nov. 19,
2008, 12:50 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/I 1/8/supreme court.
40 See Dave Hoffinan, Reversal Rates, Reconsidered, CONCURRING OPIMONS, (Sept. 30, 2011, 12 21
PM), http://w-ww.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/09/reversal-rates-reconsidered.htll Dave Hoffman,
What Should a Judge's Reversal Rate Be? CONCURRING OPINIONS, (May 26, 2009, 3:20 PM), http:/www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/05/what-should-a-judges-reversal-rate-be.html.
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few cases from each federal circuit every year. For the three-year window of
cases for which we collected data, we would have been comparing a lot of
zeroes and ones for the 136 judges in our pool. Second, this was the one
quantitative measure regarding Sotomayor's performance on the lower court
that did receive attention during her nomination process. Some initially
claimed that her reversal rate was unacceptably high. For example, the
Washington Times ran a headline titled Supreme Court Overturned 60% of
Sotomayor's Rulings.4 1 Wendy Long, counsel to the Judicial Confirmation
Network, said that Sotomayor "has an extremely high rate of her decisions
being reversed, indicating that she is far more of a liberal activist than even the
current liberal activist Supreme Court."42 Others countered that Sotomayor's
rate of reversal (reversed on three out of the five cases that were appealed) was
quite acceptable when compared to the overall reversal rate of the High Court
during the period in question (roughly in the region of 75%).43
IV. ANALYSIS
As a starting point, it helps to put the numbers that we are going to see
within the context of the debate over Sotomayor's merit. Her detractors
characterized her as having a mediocre record as a lower court judge and
therefore unqualified on her merits to sit on the Supreme Court.44 Of those
other candidates, the federal judge whose name came up most often and who
was thought to have unimpeachable intellectual stature was Diane Wood, of
the Seventh Circuit.
45
Where would the Sotomayor skeptics expect her to rank vis-A-vis the pool
of possible alternative candidates for elevation to the High Court? Given the
rhetoric described at the outset from scholars such as Tribe, Turley, and Rosen,
we assume that the critics would predict Sotomayor to be in the bottom quarter
41 See Stephen Dinan, Supreme Court Overturned 60% of Sotomayor's Rulings, WASH. TIMES, May 27,
2009, at Al.
42 Wash. Times, CQ Uncritically Report Criticism that Sotomayor's Supreme Court Reversal Rate Is
"High," MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (May 27, 2009, 4:09 PM), http://mediamatters.org/research/200905270038
(quoting Wendy Long in an excerpt from an article in Congressional Quarterly Today) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43 See, e.g., Sam Stein, Sotomayor's Reversals No Different than Souter or Alito, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/27/sotonayors-reversals-no-d n 208362.
html.
44 See Rosen, supra note 3.
45 See Milbank, supra note 8; Shapiro, supra note 8.
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of the distribution of all circuit court judges or at best somewhere around the
mean.
A. Publications
We propose publication numbers as a rough proxy for judicial effort.
Judges themselves talk about how published opinions take greater effort than
unpublished ones. 6 Given that the judges have discretion in terms of which
opinions they choose to designate "for publication" and which they dispose
with a short memorandum or maybe even a couple of words (e.g., "affirmed"),
the relative numbers of publications for a judge gives us a rough measure of
effort. There are numerous caveats that are in order here though, including the
fact that the circuit rules generally tell judges that they are to publish important
and precedent-creating opinions. So, judges in circuits that have a greater
diversity in terms of disputes may get a lot more cases worthy of precedent-
creating opinions. That said, only a small fraction of the cases that show up
before judges result in published opinions.4 8 In other words, each judge has
plenty of opportunities to publish. Some judges choose to avail themselves of
more of these opportunities than others.
A different caveat is that effort exerted in producing a published opinion
may be taking away effort from other judicial tasks. This, while perhaps a
concern at the district level, where judges need to do things like run trials and
decide preliminary motions, is less of a concern at the appellate level, where
the primary task is deciding appeals and explaining the reasons for those
decisions. On the other hand, appellate judges may spend less time doing due
diligence on the opinions of their fellow judges if the bulk of their time is taken
up working on their own opinions.
B. Published Opinions
Here, we examine the number of opinions each judge authored that were
sent to Westlaw with a "for publication" designation. We first look to see
whether Sotomayor is in the bottom quarter of judges. For those judges in the
46 See, e.g., Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an
Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. LJ 621, 625 (2009).
47 See generally Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEM. PROBS.,
Summer 1998, at 157 (detailing the considerations that may effecta judge's decision to publish an opinion).
48 id.
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bottom 25%, the highest number of opinions published is 53. Sotomayor, with
90 opinions, is well above that.
The mean number of published opinions is 86. As for the 75% level, the
range starts at 109 opinions. At 90 opinions, Sotomayor is above the mean but
not in the top 25%. Table I reports the top ten judges by publications. The
Seventh Circuit's Posner and Easterbrook show up at the top.
Table I. Top Ten Judges; Published Opinions
Judge Circuit Gender Publications
Posner 7 Male 276
Easterbrook 7 Male 240
Lynch 1 Female 215
Riley 8 Male 198
Smith 8 Male 196
Melloy 8 Male 195
Kanne 7 Male 189
Bye 8 Male 189
Colloton 8 Male 171
Wollman 8 Male 170
Histogram I. Distribution of Publication Rates
49
' 3 0tomayor: 90 Percentile 70.58
0 50 100 150 200 250
Publications
49 Density scales the height of the bars so that the sum of their areas equals 1.
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Given the President's interest in diversity and in appointing a female
Justice, along with the empirical reality that most Justices in recent years
have been selected from the ranks of the sitting circuit judges, one might argue
that the most relevant comparison set of judges for Sotomayor is the set of top-
performing female judges. When we break the data down in terms of the top
ten female publishers, Sotomayor is number seven on that list. Diane Wood, of
the Seventh Circuit, is number three.
C. Published Pages
Raw publication numbers standing alone may not tell us enough about
judicial effort. Some circuits may simply have cultures of sending all of their
opinions, important or not, to be published. Or there might be individual judges
who, for reasons of vanity, simply like seeing their opinions appear in print
(judges sometimes refer to the West publications as the "vanity press for
judges"5 1). Sotomayor, therefore, may have simply been choosing to publish a
lot of her very short opinions that others would not deign to publish. To test for
this, we examine the number of pages she published vis-d-vis her competitors.
We begin with the distributional cutoffs. The bottom 25% tops out at 455
pages over three years. The mean is 713 pages, and the 75% level begins at
769 pages. Sotomayor published 888 pages from 2004 until 2006, putting her
in the top quarter of judges in terms of published pages. Table 11 reports the
numbers for the top ten judges overall (two female judges, Rovner and Lynch,
are in this group). Sotomayor, with 888 pages, along with Wood, is in the
group of top ten female judges.
50 See Jouvenal, supra note 39.
51 See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? an
Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, JL. ECON. & ORG. 1, 7 n.13 (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/01/31/j leo.ewqO2O.full?sid400f5b79-da6f-404a-9at7-2b32
af327af9.
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Table II. Top Ten Judges; Published Opinion Pages
Judge Court Sex Pages
Lynch 1 Female 2010
Ripple 7 Male 1649
Lipez 1 Male 1431
Clay 6 Male 1379
Posner 7 Male 1335
Rovner 7 Female 1315
Kanne 7 Male 1296
Selya 1 Male 1206
Torruella 1 Male 1172
Gilman 6 Male 1153
Histogram II. Distribution of Published Pages
: 888 Percentile: 83.09
500 1000 1500 2000
Published Pages
D. Citations
For citations, we look to four measures: (1) citations by federal courts
outside the circuit (that is, in regions where we are confident that the cases
would not constitute binding precedent); (2) citations by courts within the
circuit; (3) citations by the state courts; and (4) citations in law reviews. As
described earlier, each audience here is likely using the citation for different
purposes, and therefore, the fact of a citation reveals different information
about the judge being cited.
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If the accounts by Tribe, Rosen, and Turley have descriptive value in this
domain, we would have little reason to expect Sotomayor to do well with any
of the audiences mentioned above. Her judicial opinions have at best been
described as workmanlike and at worst been characterized as politically biased.
Either way, one would not expect these to be the cases that other judges would
cite to when looking for sources of authority. If possible, instead of citing to a
Sotomayor opinion, they are more likely to cite to someone eminent, whose
name carries weight, like Guido Calabresi or Richard Posner. Moreover, to the
extent that citation counts measure a jurist's impact, we expect undistinguished
jurists to be at the bottom of the distribution of this measure.
In discussing the citation counts, as we did above, we begin in each case
with a description of the distributions.
E. Law Journal Citations
This is the measure where we most expected to see Sotomayor scoring near
the bottom. Even if her opinions were not as bad as characterized, the fact that
many academics appeared to have a low opinion of her work at the outset
should have resulted in her scores being low.
The distributional cutoff for the bottom 25% of judges on this measure is
175 citations. The mean number of citations, in turn, is 261. Sotomayor's law
journal citation count is 396-more than twice the number at the top of the
twenty-fifth percentile. She not only slots in well above the 75% level (the
bottom number being 323 for the top quarter) but also makes it into the top
10% (where the bottom score is 394).
Table III reports the top ten judges in terms of law journal citations.
Sotomayor does not make the top ten overall. At the top, Easterbrook and
Posner are ahead of the others. Two female judges make the top ten: Lynch of
the First Circuit and Wood of the Seventh Circuit. Sotomayor is the third-most-
cited female judge. The histogram illustrates where she ranks vis-A-vis the rest
of the active federal appellate bench.
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Table III. Top Ten Judges; Law Journal Citations
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Posner 7 Male 1054
Easterbrook 7 Male 832
Randolph DC Male 675
Lynch 1 Female 575
Birch 11 Male 553
Lipez 1 Male 534
Selya 1 Male 502
Wood 7 Female 482
Thomas 9 Male 459
Reinhardt 9 Male 458
Histogram III. Distribution Pattern of Law Journal Citations
Sotom ayor: 396 Percentile 90.44
-~ *>1
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F. Outside Citations
Of the various citation measures used by scholars as proxies for quality or
influence, outside-jurisdiction (nonprecedential) cites are the most commonly
used ones. For the most part, courts tend to cite opinions from within their
jurisdictions. Citations to courts in other jurisdictions are less common and
given out primarily when, so we presume, the opinion in question helps
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analyze a difficult question. Outside citations, therefore, provide a measure of
how useful the analysis in an opinion is, divorced from precedential value.5
2
In the numbers we report, we add the numbers of citations from outside
appeals courts to those from outside district courts. The distributional cutoff
at the bottom end of the distribution for outside citations (for the bottom 25%)
is 180. The mean number of citations is 310. Sotomayor's number of citations
is 538. Those with more than 372 citations fall in the top quarter. That puts her
at more than 150 citations above the cutoff for the top 25% of judges.
Table IV reports the top ten judges by outside-circuit citations. Posner and
Easterbrook are at the top. Among the female judges, Lynch and Wood also
show up again in the top ten overall. Sotomayor makes the top ten for female
judges, slotting in at the third spot after Wood and Lynch.
Table IV. Top Ten Judges; Outside-Circuit Citations
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Easterbrook 7 Male 1873
Posner 7 Male 1489
Lynch 1 Female 890
Melloy 8 Male 848
Lipez 1 Male 778
Jacobs 2 Male 734
Wood 7 Female 716
Selya 1 Male 692
Calabresi 2 Male 635
Kanne 7 Male 584
Given that our outside-citations measure combines citations for both
outside circuit courts and district courts, one might wonder about the
breakdown between the two. Arguably, different information is revealed from
the fact that a judge has a high district court citation count than from the fact
that her high citation count is largely driven by appeals court citations. Below,
we report separate histograms on the distributions of outside citations, as
broken down in terms of level of court. Sotomayor is on the high side of the
distribution in both cases, but she does significantly better on citations from
other appeals courts.
52 E.g., Landes et al., supra note 23.
53 We also add in citations from bankruptcy and tax courts.
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Histograms IV & V. Outside-Circuit and Outside-District Citations
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G. Inside Citations
A relatively underused citation measure is the number of inside-circuit
citations. Here, the citations are primarily by lower courts within the circuit,
for which the opinions by the circuit are precedential. This does not mean,
however, that the sole reason for the citations is that the circuit's opinion
n
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constituted precedent. Courts within the circuit will often have a wide range of
cases from various judges that they can choose from to cite. The fact that one
judge is consistently cited much more than others, therefore, potentially reveals
something about the kinds of opinions that that judge is writing, as compared
to his peers. A caveat here is that this measure is going to be significantly
biased both in favor of and against judges from bigger circuits. In the bigger
circuits, because there are many more appeals court decisions and many more
district judges, the favored judges will get more cites. But, on the flip side,
because the lower court judges have a greater degree of choice in terms of
whom to cite, they can show more favoritism and more easily ignore the
appellate judges they disfavor. Sotomayor, being on the Second Circuit, is on
one of the larger circuits.
Once again, we begin with the distributional characteristics of the variable.
At the bottom, at the 0-25% level, the highest number of citations is 349. The
mean number of inside citations is 628. And, at the 75-100% level, the bottom
number is 852.
Sotomayor's number of inside citations is 6182. That puts her at the top for
all judges and in the top ten for female judges (along with, yet again, Wood
and Lynch).
Table V. Top Ten Judges; Inside-Circuit Citations
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Sotomayor 2 Female 6182
Posner 7 Male 5098
Raggi 2 Female 5095
Gould 9 Male 4827
Kanne 7 Male 4670
Cabranes 2 Male 4519
Easterbrook 7 Male 4329
Wood 7 Female 4296
Calabresi 2 Male 4170
Ripple 7 Male 4158
To show the split in Sotomayor's inside citations between citations from
the lower courts and by other panels of the Second Circuit, we report the
histograms for inside-circuit and inside-district citations separately. As with
the outside citations reported earlier, Sotomayor does better on the inside-
circuit citations than with the district citations.
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Histograms VI & VII. Inside-Circuit and Inside-District Citations
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H. State Court Citations
The state-court-citation measure is also a relatively underused measure.
Like the inside-circuit-citation measure, it also has a built-in bias in that federal
courts that sit in more densely populated states are likely to have more state
court decisions citing them (because many of the issues are likely similar,
particularly with diversity jurisdiction cases). With that caveat, the bottom
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quarter of judges, in terms of citations from the state courts, tops out at 31
citations for the three-year period that we use. The mean number of citations is
roughly 53 for the three years, and the cutoff for the 75% range is 67.
Sotomayor has 158 cites from the state courts for the 2004 to 2006 period.
That puts her not only in the top quarter of all judges (that is, above the 75%
cutoff) but also at the very top of all judges. The only judge who does better
than she does is Judge O'Scannlain, who has one cite more than she does.
Table VI reports on the top ten judges in terms of state citations. Sotomayor is
the only female judge to make the top-ten list for state court citations.
Table VI. Top Ten Judges; State Court Citations
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
O'Scannlain 9 Male 159
Sotomayor 2 Female 158
Posner 7 Male 157
Howard 1 Male 129
Easterbrook 7 Male 127
Selya 1 Male 118
Gilman 6 Male 116
Lipez 1 Male 115
Colloton 8 Male 111
Torruella 1 Male 103
In terms of the female judges, Sotomayor has the highest score. Histogram
VIII provides a graphical illustration of state court citations.
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Histogram VIII. Distribution of State Citations
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I. The Team-Player Effect
A criticism that could be leveled against the prior measures is that they
treat appellate judging as an individual act. But appeals court judges almost
always operate in panels (typically three-judge panels, unless there is a rare en
banc panel). To fully evaluate the amount a judge contributes in terms of
quality, therefore, one should take into account not only the performance of the
opinions where the judge was the primary author but also the performance of
opinions where she was a secondary player. To estimate this secondary-author
effect, we construct a measure that compares each of our 136 judges, for the
three years for which we have data, in terms of citation counts to opinions
where they were secondary actors in producing the opinion.
A caveat here is that, at least as a matter of anecdote, overburdened federal
judges in the modern era typically spend the vast majority of their time on the
opinions for which they are the primary author and a small amount of time on
those for which they are secondary authors. Moreover, the measure does not
distinguish between potential ways of contributing to a team. A judge could do
more due diligence or threaten to whistle-blow, i.e., dissent from a poorly
constructed majority opinion. A judge could also simply contribute by being
present as a diverse input. Or a judge could do nothing and let the primary
author be solely responsible for the opinion. From our perspective, it is not
necessary to be able to unpack the precise fashion in which an individual judge
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contributes to the team product. Because the question being asked involves
estimating merit for elevation to the High Court and because the High Court is
more team-production oriented than the lower appeals courts (nine Justices, as
opposed to three judges), a judge who contributes positively to the team at the
lower level may contribute similarly on the High Court.
In theory, we could generate these secondary-author effects for all of our
citation measures. However, because of space constraints, we only report it for
the primary-citation measure used in the literature-outside citations (the sum
of citations from federal appeals courts in other circuits and outside federal
district courts). 54
The top of the range for the bottom 25% is 212 citations. And the mean
number of citations is 363. Sotomayor has a count of 615, which is well
outside the range of the bottom 25% and much above the mean. The cutoff for
the top 25% on this measure is 410.5. Sotomayor has a count of 615, which
makes the cutoff for the top 10%.
Histogram IX. Distribution of Team Citations
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54 Other measures are available on request.
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Table VII. Top Ten Judges; Team-Citation Effect
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Rovner 7 Female 1436
Williams 7 Female 1433
Wood 7 Female 1394
Howard 1 Male 1113
Kanne 7 Male 1096
Ripple 7 Male 1014
Posner 7 Male 1004
Evans 7 Male 976
Manion 7 Male 908
Riley 8 Male 852
As the table for the top ten judges illustrates though, the problem with the
team analysis is that it basically picks up strong-circuit effects. That is, circuits
that have cultures of high levels of productivity will have their judges show up
as high performers (of course, because we are measuring team effects). Also,
there is likely a Posner-Easterbrook-Wood effect on the Seventh Circuit. The
other judges on their circuit may have high team numbers because they are
inevitably sitting with one or two of the triumvirate of Posner-Easterbrook-
Wood. The top-ten table here, therefore, is dominated by Seventh Circuit
judges.
In the top-ten list for females, Sotomayor shows up as number four. Wood
(who was also in the top-ten-overall list) and Lynch also show up here. 55
J. Circuit and Subject-Area Controls
As others have noted, the various circuits can differ in terms of culture.56
For example, some might develop cultures of publication, where the judges are
55 One might expect that these measures should be roughly twice the citation count for when judges are
authors of the opinions (after all, judges write opinions on only about a third of the cases that they decide).
They are not. The reason has to do with the fact that we restrict our analysis to the 136 active judges who
authored opinions throughout the period from 2004 to 2006. Many of the panels also have nonwriting judges,
such as judges from district courts, senior judges, and judges who were promoted during the timeframe. See
generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requienifor the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 287 (1996) (discussing the use of visiting
judges on appellate court panels).
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under peer pressure to publish, and others might, for whatever reason, disfavor
publication. 57 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has long had a culture of
publishing many more opinions (and garnering many more cites) than the other
circuits.58 Circuits can also differ in terms of the types of cases that they
receive. The cases that show up in front of a federal court in Montana are
going to be quite different than those that show up in New York City. The
former, for example, is unlikely to see a case involving the resolution of the
debt crisis in Argentina.59 Individual judges also will differ in terms of the
types of cases they take on-judges, because of their backgrounds and the
relative expertise levels of their colleagues, may choose to take on opinions in
particular subject areas and defer to their colleagues in others.
The measures presented thus far have not controlled for these effects. And
whether they should is a complicated matter. Most of these circuits tend to be
small, and that means that the culture is, in significant part, likely to be the
product of the preferences and collaborative instincts of the judges on that
circuit. Put differently, having developed a culture of high productivity in a
circuit is arguably an indication of merit in and of itself. The same argument
can be made for subject areas. If a judge goes out of her way to pick her
writing assignments for cases in subject areas that produce high levels of
citations, that fact is itself arguably an indicator of merit. Those caveats aside
though, circuit cultures can be a function of long-past historical events, and the
subject areas in which a judge receives cases can be determined by location.
In this final section, therefore, we report on the rankings of judges on the
outside-citation measure and law-journal-citation measure, where we control
for both circuit and subject-area effects. We also control for year effects
because the date of publication is likely an important determinant of the
number of citations accrued by our cutoff date.
60
56 See James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background
Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1680 (1999) (explaining that prior studies have failed
to address significant differences in circuit court cultures), Choi & Gulati, supra note 23, at 44-45.
57 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 23, at 44-45.
58 See John R Lott, Jr., Op-Ed., Pulling Rank, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at Al; Orin Kerr, Rates of
Unpublished Opinions in the Different Circuits-and Especially the Fourth Circuit, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Sept. 8, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/09/08/rates-of-unpublished-opinions-in-the-difterent-
circuits-and-especially-the-fourth-circuit/ (listing the Seventh Circuit with the lowest rate of unpublished
opinions).
59 E.g., NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 621 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2010).
60 Because citations are calculated for all opinions from the period from 2004 until 2006, tallied from the
date of publication up to January I, 2009, opinions written in 2004 will garner more citations than those
written in 2006, other things equal.
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Formally, our specification is:
Outcome,,, =flj*Judge, + Year, + Subject, +E,
In this equation, i denotes casej denotes judge, c denotes circuit, y denotes
year, and s denotes subject. We consider two outcomes: total outside citations
and citations from law reviews and treatises. 61 The coefficients of interest are
62J3j, the fixed-effect coefficients on the dummy indicators for each judge. The
error term is represented by gycy. These coefficients give us an average citation
count per published opinion written by the judges.
In all of these regressions, we omit the dummy indicator for Sotomayor.
Consequently, the judge-fixed effects indicate each judge's performance in
comparison to Sotomayor's and whether the comparison is statistically
significantly different.
Column 1 of Table A in Appendix A reports unadjusted judge-fixed effects
without adjusting for year, subject, or circuit. To situate the reader and make
these results comparable to the previous descriptive statistics, Histogram X
shows the distribution of per capita outside citations, and Histogram XII shows
the distribution of law review citations. Column 2 controls for year-fixed
effects, and Column 3 controls for year- and subject-fixed effects. Column 4
standardizes by the mean and standard deviation for the outcomes within each
circuit and also controls for year- and subject-fixed effects. We could not
directly include circuit-fixed effects because our primary interest is in the
judge-fixed effects, and if we included the circuit-fixed effects, eleven judges
would drop out due to collinearity. Histograms XI and XIII show the
distribution of these standardized fixed effects.
We find that Sotomayor ranks twelfth in outside citations per case among
all judges (as seen in Table A of Appendix A). Only five judges have
statistically significant (at the 10% level) more outside citations per case than
her. Sixty-six judges have statistically significant fewer outside citations per
case than her, and this number increases slightly when adjusting for year- and
subject-fixed effects. When the citations are normalized by the mean and
standard deviation of citations within each circuit, Sotomayor still does better
than most judges, as indicated by Histogram XI. None of the judge-fixed
effects are statistically significant in Column 4 of Table A.
61 Other regressions are available on request.
62 A dummy indicator is equal to one if the observation belongs to that judge and zero otherwise
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On law reviews also, Sotomayor performs well. Only five judges have
statistically significant more law review citations per case than her (as seen in
Table B of Appendix A), while forty judges have statistically significant fewer
law review citations per case than her.
Histogram X. Distribution of Outside Citations per Case
5.977 Percentile 91.18
Histogram XI. Distribution of Normalized Outside Citations per Case
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Histogram XII. Distribution of Law Review Citations per Case
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Histogram XIII. Distribution of Normalized Law Review Citations per Case
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V. OUTLIERS
A final test is to examine whether Sotomayor's scores are being driven by
outliers. For example, perhaps a large fraction of her citations come from just
[Vol. 61:801
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MERIT
one or two big opinions. Further, what if those one or two opinions were in
cases where her assignment to those cases was purely by random chance?
Maybe those were cases addressing topics of first impression that then got
cited everywhere simply because those were the first cases of those types. 63 To
test for the outlier effect, we winsorize our citation data to address the
possibility that outliers are driving the results. Specifically, we replace the top
0.5% extreme values with the 99.5 percentile value and replace the bottom
0.5% extreme values with the 0.5 percentile. We restrict our attention to the
two primary forms of citation measures: outside citations and law review
citations.
The results indicate that Sotomayor's relative performance against the other
judges is not being driven by the presence of outliers. Indeed, she performs
slightly better against her colleagues when the data are adjusted for outliers.
On the winsorized measures, Sotomayor is in the top ten among all judges for
outside citations. She is still at the 90.44 percentile for law review citations.
Posner, Easterbrook, Wood, and Lynch all show up again in both top-ten
tables.
Table VIII. Top Ten Judges; Outside Citations (Winsorized)
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Posner 7 Male 1310
Easterbrook 7 Male 1270
Lynch 1 Female 883
Selya 1 Male 674
Wood 7 Female 674
Ripple 7 Male 576
Kanne 7 Male 568
Lipez 1 Male 559
Sotomayor 2 Female 498
McConnell 10 Male 492
63 The issue of outliers obviously does not apply to the measure of published opinions
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Histogram XIV. Distribution of Outside Citations (Winsorized)
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Table IX. Top Ten Judges; Law Review & Periodical Citations (Winsorized)
Judge Circuit Sex Citations
Posner 7 Male 946
Easterbrook 7 Male 768
Lynch 1 Female 575
Selya 1 Male 502
Wood 7 Female 457
Lipez 1 Male 440
Ripple 7 Male 394
Reinhardt 9 Male 389
Cabranes 2 Male 383
Smith 5 Male 381
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Histogram XV. Distribution of Law Review & Periodical Citations
(Winsorized)
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Unreported here, we also examined the winsorized outside-citation
regressions (where, as described earlier, we control for matters such as circuit-,
year-, and subject-area effects). 64 Once again, Sotomayor performs better with
the winsorizing process. Previously, in the raw data, six judges performed
statistically significantly better than Sotomayor. Now, in the winsorized data,
no judge performs statistically significantly better than Sotomayor, and forty
additional judges perform statistically significantly worse than her.
CONCLUSION
Sotomayor's critics described her as a mediocre judge, one unworthy to
take a place on the High Court. Our data do not support that conclusion.
According to our measures, she was one of the best judges on the courts of
appeals. We compared her performance whilst on the Second Circuit against
that of all the other active federal appeals court judges over a three-year period.
She was easily in the top 25% of all of the judges on the courts of appeals in
almost all of the categories that we examined. Moreover, in more than half the
categories, she was in the top 10%. These results should at least bring into
question the claims of her mediocrity. Indeed, based on our results, there is the
64 These results are available from the authors.
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strong possibility that she was, during her tenure on the Second Circuit, among
the most capable and influential appeals court judges in the country.
Among the responses we have received from our academic colleagues so
far, one that we have heard a few times is that demonstrating that Sotomayor
shows up in the top 25% or top 10% of all judges does not in fact challengeS • 65
claims of her mediocrity. That, for promotion to the High Court, an appeals
court judge should show up in the top 1% or 2% of all judges. Maybe so. But
then that same standard should be applied across the board. And if so, the
subset of names we would be considering for elevation would be rather small.
Table X sets out a summary of Sotomayor's performance on the various
measures.
65 To be specific, we were told that we were "damning her with faint praise" and were doing more harm
than good by bringing up the issue of her merit again.
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Table X. Sotomayor's Performance Vis-A-Vis Thirteen Measures
Measure Bottom Above Top Top Ten Top Ten Percentile
25% the Afean 25% (Female) (Overall)
Publications N Y N Y N 70.6%
Pages N Y Y Y N 83.1%
Law Journal N Y Y Y N 90.4%
Cites
Outside- N Y Y Y N 95.6%
Circuit Cites
Inside-Circuit N Y Y Y Y 99.6%
Cites
State Court N Y Y Y Y 99.2%
Cites
Secondary- N Y Y Y N 89.7%
Author Effect:
Outside Cites
Controlling N Y Y Y N Outside
for Subject- Cites:
Area Effects 91.2%
Law Rev.
Cites:
83.8%
Normalizing N Y Y N N Outside
for Circuit Cites:
Effects 82.4%
Law Rev.
Cites:
55.9%
Winsorized N Y Y Y Y Outside
Outside Cites Cites:
and N Y Y Y N 93.38%
Law Journal Law Rev.
Cites Cites:
90.44%
A related question is whether the treatment Sotomayor received was any
different from what other candidates from the appeals courts would have
received. We cannot do an effective comparison here because so few appeals
court judges get promoted to the High Court. But a couple of casual
comparisons do suggest that the treatment Sotomayor received, in terms of
questions about her intellectual capabilities as a judge, was different. One
contemporaneous comparison is to Diane Wood, who performed at roughly the
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same level as Sotomayor and was a serious contender for the Court at least
twice in recent years. 66  Wood's intellectual capabilities were generally
lauded 67 and not challenged in anywhere near the fashion as Sotomayor's
were.
Justice Alito, who was elevated to the High Court some years prior,
provides another imperfect comparison. In a prior study, done before Alito's
nomination, his performance was ranked against that of his colleagues. 68 Like
we did for Sotomayor, we examined the data on him for a three-year period
69that came roughly from the middle of his tenure on the bench. Overall, he
was sixteenth out of a sample of roughly one hundred federal appellate judges
who were under the age of sixty-five-to our minds, a high level of
performance. 70 The nomination was contentious, and Alito was attacked from
many directions. 71 But his intellectual capabilities did not receive serious
challenge-if anything, there seemed to be general agreement regarding his
high level of intellect. With Sotomayor, however, things were different.
Our point, though, is not to complain about the treatment Sotomayor
received. It is to raise the question of whether, in cases like this, where there is
a risk of bias with the subjective measures, more attention should be paid to
objective measures. When there is a disconnect between the subjective
conclusions and the objective measures, it may be worth looking deeper.
66 Wood also performed at a high level in a prior study examining a time period roughly five years prior.
See Choi & Gulati, supra note 23, at 68-69.
67 See John McConnick& Jeff Coe, Driven Judge Has Music in Her Heart, CnH. TRB., May 24, 2009, at
C6; David Savage, Obama Speaks with Diane Wood Ahead of Supreme Court Pick, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2010,
at C 10.
68 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 23, at 83.
69 See id. at 31 (narrowing the period to the years from 1998 until 2000). Unlike in our current study
though, Justice Afto's performance was not the primary subject of the prior study. See id.
70 See id. at 113 15. Our current sample looks at a broader set of judges than the prior study did, because
we look at all active judges and not just the ones under the age of sixty-five. If we were to assume that the
additional judges would have all performed in the bottom half of the distribution, then Alito would be roughly
near the top 10% of all judges (16 out of 136). Another issue to note in the Alito comparison is that Alito's
scores were particularly high on a category that we did not estimate for this project: independence. Id. at 69.
Independence in the prior study was measured as a function of dissents against other judges with the same
party affiliation (the overall measure being normalized for the relative numbers of judges from each party on
the circuit in question). See id. at 64.
71 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Scrambling to Prepare for a Tough Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
I, 2005, at A23 (noting that Alito's record on abortion and other contentious issues made for a tough fight in
the Senate).
72 We should point out that our analysis cannot completely separate individual merit from a possible
diversity effect. Perhaps being on the Second Circuit, Sotomayor got highly cited because of her "different"
perspective vis-a-vis her colleagues. Nevertheless, a clean measure of individual merit is not necessary to ask
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Ultimately, do our data tell us anything about Sotomayor's future
performance as a Supreme Court Justice? Presumably, those who opposed her
nomination on the ground that she was not that smart were also making a
prediction with respect to her impact on the Supreme Court. On the basis of
our measures, we are willing to wager that she surprises her critics by
outperforming the majority of her colleagues on the Court.
whether Sotomayor was as meritorious as other candidate judges, because she would bring her diversity effect
to the Supreme Court as well.
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APPENDIX A
Column 1 of Table A reports unadjusted judge-fixed effects, i.e., without
adjusting for year, subject, or circuit. Column 2 controls for year-fixed effects.
Column 3 controls for year- and subject-fixed effects. Column 4 standardizes
by the mean and standard deviation for the outcomes within each circuit and
also controls for year- and subject-fixed effects. Coefficients are displayed in
the first row, and standard errors in brackets are displayed in the second row.
Each pair of rows represents the fixed effect for the judge listed. Each judge is
identified by last name and his or her circuit. Year- and subject-matter-fixed-
effect coefficients are displayed at the bottom.
Table A. Outside Citations per Case
Barry (3)
Scirica (3)
Batchelder (6)
Anderson (11)
Calabresi (2)
Hull (11)
Jacobs (2)
Easterbrook (7)
Marcus (11)
8.594
Outside
Citations
8.817
[2.431]*** [2.426]***
4.308 3.986
[1.998]** [1.994]**
4.258 4.149
[1.758]** [1.754]**
3.701
[2.171] *
2.966
[1.592]*
2.244
[1.978]
2.178
[1.4951
1.826
[1.240]
1.28
[1.6261
3.677
[2.1661*
2.958
[1.589]*
2.271
[1.974]
2.161
[1.492]
1.719
[1.2371
1.304
[1.622]
(4)
Normalized
Outside
Citations
0.0253
[0.240]
-0.0863
[0.198]
-0.00702
[0.174]
-0.0264
[0.215]
0.0000161
[0.158]
-0.00317
[0.196]
-0.018
[0.148]
-0.0442
[0.123]
0.0304
[0.162]
8.855
[2.425]***
3.799
[1.996]*
4.192
[1.753]**
3.606
[2.166]*
3.074
[1.588]*
2.276
[1.976]
2.127
[1.492]
1.566
[1.238]
1.485
[1.631]
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King (5) 1.238 1.123 1.173 -0.00997
[1.633] [1.629] [1.629] [0.162]
Wilkins (4) 0.815 0.59 0.464 -0.0326
[1.737] [1.733] [1.734] [0.172]
Raggi (2) -0.204 -0.344 -0.48 -0.0344
[1.737] [1.733] [1.732] [0.172]
Wilson (11) -0.248 -0.245 -0.0762 0.0281
[1.959] [1.955] [1.960] [0.194]
Lipez (1) -0.257 -0.337 -0.49 -0.0344
[1.363] [1.360] [1.360] [0.135]
Paez (9) -0.382 -0.571 -0.543 -0.0377
[1.805] [1.802] [1.802] [0.179]
Traxler (4) -0.503 -0.582 -0.769 -0.0285
[1.906] [1.902] [1.902] [0.189]
Katzmann (2) -0.539 -0.582 -0.579 -0.018
[1.890] [1.886] [1.887] [0.187]
Posner (7) -0.583 -0.654 -0.586 -0.0154
[1.218] [1.215] [1.216] [0.121]
Carnes (11) -0.589 -0.544 -0.598 0.00422
[1.586] [1.583] [1.584] [0.157]
Birch (11) -0.621 -0.758 -0.816 -0.0537
[1.707] [1.704] [1.706] [0.169]
Wilkinson (4) -0.657 -0.757 -0.804 -0.0367
[1.536] [1.533] [1.534] [0.152]
Sack (2) -0.937 -0.924 -1.101 -0.0293
[1.580] [1.577] [1.575] [0.156]
Shedd (4) -0.955 -1.091 -1.219 -0.0267
[1.860] [1.856] [1.855] [0.184]
Duncan (4) -1.01 -1.222 -1.334 -0.0472
[2.089] [2.085] [2.085] [0.207]
Reinhardt (9) -1.043 -1.148 -1.324 -0.0619
[1.557] [1.554] [1.555] [0.154]
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McKeown (9) -1.175 -1.216 -1.356 -0.0484
[1.626] [1.622] [1.624] [0.161]
Cabranes (2) -1.26 -1.403 -1.504 -0.0388
[1.487] [1.484] [1.484] [0.147]
Williams (4) -1.272 -1.208 -1.203 0.0064
[1.758] [1.754] [1.755] [0.174]
Graber(9) -1.281 -1.384 -1.538 -0.0456
[1.626] [1.622] [1.622] [0.161]
Tjoflat (11) -1.422 -1.65 -1.672 -0.0383
[1.586] [1.583] [1.587] [0.157]
Sloviter (3) -1.503 -1.635 -1.892 -0.0514
[1.552] [1.549] [1.548] [0.154]
Davis (5) -1.526 -1.594 -1.473 0.00784
[1.656] [1.652] [1.654] [0.164]
Selya (1) -1.598 -1.736 -1.858 -0.0402
[1.325] [1.322] [1.321] [0.131]
Smith (3) -1.608 -1.62 -1.693 -0.015
[1.818] [1.814] [1.814] [0.180]
Wood (7) -1.612 -1.75 -1.852 -0.0413
[1.316] [1.313] [1.313] [0.130]
Melloy (8) -1.629 -1.747 -1.81 -0.0226
[1.278] [1.276] [1.277] [0.127]
Rendell (3) -1.63 -1.764 -1.884 -0.0583
[1.818] [1.814] [1.815] [0.180]
Thomas (9) -1.705 -1.86 -1.871 -0.0516
[1.717] [1.714] [1.716] [0.170]
Dubina (11) -1.728 -1.74 -1.755 -0.0156
[1.793] [1.789] [1.789] [0.177]
McConnell
(10) -1.773 -1.714 -1.754 0.0139
[1.406] [1.403] [1.405] [0.139]
Tymkovich
(10) -1.809 -1.829 -1.988 -0.0107
[1.499] [1.496] [1.496] [0.148]
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Lynch (1)
Sutton (6)
Fisher (3)
Black (11)
Ambro (3)
Wiener (5)
Boudin (1)
Michael (4)
Moore (6)
Murphy (10)
Fletcher (9)
Fuentes (3)
Pooler (2)
Gibbons (6)
Hartz (10)
Cook (6)
-1.838
[1.259]
-1.893
[1.527]
-1.931
[1.860]
-1.978
[1.8741
-2.023
[1.499]
-2.026
[1.656]
-2.064
[1.382]
-2.069
[1.717]
-2.088
[1.429]
-2.101
[1.536]
-2.167
[1.5741
-2.182
[1.781]
-2.228
[1.586]
-2.249
[1.599]
-2.282
[1.380]*
-2.364
[1.845]
-1.973
[1.257]
-1.881
[1.523]
-1.786
[1.856]
-2.075
[1.871]
-1.95
[1.496]
-2.139
[1.652]
-2.153
[1.379]
-2.2
[1.713]
-2.029
[1.426]
-2.166
[1.533]
-2.315
[1.571]
-2.138
[1.7771
-2.266
[1.583]
-2.248
[1.5951
-2.382
[1.377]*
-2.487
[1.841]
-2.028
[1.256]
-1.978
[1.523]
-1.992
[1.855]
-2.029
[1.871]
-2.071
[1.496]
-2
[1.652]
-2.159
[1.379]
-2.238
[1.714]
-2.224
[1.426]
-2.331
[1.535]
-2.401
[1.572]
-2.257
[1.776]
-2.319
[1.582]
-2.416
[1.594]
-2.425
[1.378]*
-2.49
[1.841]
-0.0425
[0.125]
-0.0159
[0.151]
-0.0213
[0.184]
0.00709
[0.186]
-0.0176
[0.148]
-0.000305
[0.164]
-0.00979
[0.137]
-0.0301
[0.170]
-0.00775
[0.141]
-0.024
[0.152]
-0.0573
[0.156]
-0.0127
[0.176]
-0.0292
[0.157]
-0.0204
[0.158]
-0.00494
[0.137]
-0.0166
[0.183]
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Fisher (9) -2.369 -2.523 -2.622 -0.0424
[1.605] [1.602] [1.602] [0.159]
Garland (DC) -2.39 -2.512 -2.258 0.02
[1.648] [1.644] [1.651] [0.164]
Bybee (9) -2.416 -2.426 -2.491 -0.00806
[1.698] [1.694] [1.694] [0.168]
Ripple (7) -2.426 -2.522 -2.523 -0.0198
[1.317]* [1.315]* [1.317]* [0.131]
Berzon (9) -2.437 -2.508 -2.595 -0.0344
[1.517] [1.514]* [1.514]* [0.150]
Smith (5) -2.443 -2.401 -2.566 -0.00933
[1.409]* [1.406]* [1.406]* [0.139]
Parker (2) -2.444 -2.467 -2.546 -0.0199
[1.672] [1.668] [1.668] [0.165]
Jones (5) -2.497 -2.668 -2.819 -0.0502
[1.557] [1.554]* [1.554]* [0.154]
Hawkins (9) -2.521 -2.8 -2.865 -0.0748
[1.998] [1.994] [1.996] [0.198]
Wesley (2) -2.528 -2.56 -2.588 -0.0122
[1.906] [1.902] [1.903] [0.189]
Boggs (6) -2.557 -2.739 -2.918 -0.0414
[1.605] [1.602]* [1.602]* [0.159]
Kelly (10) -2.581 -2.683 -2.67 -0.00763
[1.580] [1.577]* [1.578]* [0.157]
Higginbotham
(5) -2.615 -2.596 -2.549 0.0196
[1.541]* [1.538]* [1.538]* [0.152]
Motz (4) -2.69 -2.803 -2.775 -0.0148
[1.580]* [1.577]* [1.581]* [0.157]
Straub (2) -2.717 -2.811 -2.738 -0.012
[1.818] [1.814] [1.813] [0.180]
Ginsburg (DC) -2.745 -2.912 -2.653 0.00539
[1.580]* [1.577]* [1.585]* [0.157]
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Gould (9) -2.761 -2.917 -2.979 -0.0297
[1.468]* [1.465]** [1.467]** [0.145]
Howard (1) -2.765 -2.821 -2.886 -0.00756
[1.394]** [1.391]** [1.390]** [0.138]
Pregerson (9) -2.781 -2.789 -2.946 -0.042
[1.592]* [1.589]* [1.589]* [0.158]
Lucero (10) -2.793 -2.901 -2.74 0.0098
[1.487]* [1.484]* [1.484]* [0.147]
Henry (10) -2.884 -3.075 -3.025 -0.0249
[1.640]* [1.637]* [1.639]* [0.163]
Clifton (9) -2.887 -3.082 -3.214 -0.0554
[1.845] [1.8421* [1.841]* [0.183]
Kanne (7) -2.888 -2.953 -3.1 -0.0305
[1.285]** [1.282]** [1.284]** [0.127]
Daughtrey (6) -2.947 -2.954 -2.911 0.00073
[2.041] [2.037] [2.037] [0.202]
O' Scannlain
(9) -3.001 -3.011 -3.031 -0.0111
[1.504]** [1.501]** [1.501]** [0.149]
Manion (7) -3.03 -3.108 -3.123 -0.0209
[1.409]** [1.406]** [1.408]** [0.140]
Wardlaw (9) -3.037 -3.024 -3.259 -0.052
[1.758]* [1.755]* [1.756]* [0.174]
Luttig (4) -3.079 -3.285 -3.219 -0.0239
[1.680]* [1.677]* [1.678]* [0.166]
Rovner (7) -3.106 -3.284 -3.338 -0.0389
[1.316]** [1.313]** [1.314]** [0.130]
Flaum (7) -3.123 -3.251 -3.28 -0.0326
[1.346]** [1.343]** [1.346]** [0.133]
Briscoe (10) -3.212 -3.259 -3.266 -0.00406
[1.536]** [1.533]** [1.533]** [0.152]
Tacha (10) -3.238 -3.361 -3.524 -0.0212
[1.580]** [1.577]** [1.577]** [0.156]
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Kleinfeld (9) -3.258 -3.392 -3.601 -0.0424
[1.698]* [1.695]** [1.694]** [0.168]
O'Brien (10) -3.263 -3.219 -3.458 -0.0164
[1.874]* [1.870]* [1.872]* [0.186]
Niemeyer (4) -3.289 -3.365 -3.41 -0.0357
[1.557]** [1.554]** [1.555]** [0.154]
Williams (7) -3.308 -3.495 -3.57 -0.0413
[1.389]** [1.386]** [1.387]** [0.138]
Clay (6) -3.311 -3.327 -3.367 -0.000371
[1.371]** [1.368]** [1.368]** [0.136]
Cole (6) -3.32 -3.484 -3.455 -0.0159
[1.580]** [1.577]** [1.576]** [0.156]
Jolly (5) -3.378 -3.528 -3.496 -0.0225
[1.568]** [1.565]** [1.565]** [0.155]
Sentelle (DC) -3.386 -3.568 -3.246 0.0204
[1.592]** [1.589]** [1.605]** [0.159]
Gilman (6) -3.393 -3.401 -3.52 -0.00464
[1.323]** [1.320]** [1.320]*** [0.131]
Randolph (DC) -3.411 -3.519 -3.474 -0.0122
[1.619]** [1.615]** [1.622]** [0.161]
Murphy (8) -3.444 -3.494 -3.637 -0.0172
[1.365]** [1.362]** [1.364]*** [0.135]
Silverman (9) -3.448 -3.623 -3.857 -0.0778
[2.019]* [2.015]* [2.015]* [0.200]
Rawlinson (9) -3.457 -3.71 -4.048 -0.0888
[1.793]* [1.789]** [1.789]** [0.177]
Loken (8) -3.472 -3.493 -3.589 -0.0147
[1.322]*** [1.319]*** [1.320]*** [0.131]
Colloton (8) -3.51 -3.543 -3.566 0.00315
[1.306]*** [1.304]*** [1.305]*** [0.129]
McKee (3) -3.51 -3.957 -4.086 -0.0846
[1.805]* [1.802]** [1.802]** [0.179]
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Barkett (11) -3.522 -3.704 -3.828 -0.0467
[1.698]** [1.695]** [1.695]** [0.168]
Benavides (5) -3.544 -3.446 -3.411 0.0182
[1.527]** [1.523]** [1.522]** [0.151]
Tatel (DC) -3.545 -3.752 -3.365 0.0148
[1.574]** [1.571]** [1.579]** [0.157]
King (4) -3.549 -3.612 -3.666 -0.023
[1.599]** [1.595]** [1.596]** [0.158]
Kozinski (9) -3.568 -3.647 -3.824 -0.0379
[1.664]** [1.660]** [1.661]** [0.165]
Tallman (9) -3.594 -3.823 -3.95 -0.0581
[1.672]** [1.669]** [1.668]** [0.165]
Schroeder (9) -3.599 -3.828 -3.767 -0.0397
[1.959]* [1.955]* [1.958]* [0.194]
Rogers (6) -3.641 -3.736 -3.733 -0.0059
[1.426]** [1.423]*** [1.423]*** [0.141]
Clement (5) -3.657 -3.773 -3.948 -0.0333
[1.536]** [1.533]** [1.533]** [0.152]
Torruella (1) -3.663 -3.733 -3.775 -0.0154
[1.314]*** [1.312]*** [1.311]*** [0.130]
DeMoss (5) -3.675 -3.957 -3.765 -0.02
[1.563]** [1.560]** [1.561]** [0.155]
Prado (5) -3.692 -3.773 -3.846 -0.026
[1.557]** [1.554]** [1.554]** [0.154]
Barksdale (5) -3.728 -3.796 -4.026 -0.0334
[1.845]** [1.841]** [1.844]** [0.183]
Martin (6) -3.731 -3.82 -3.727 0.00292
[1.351]*** [1.349]*** [1.348]*** [0.134]
Wollman (8) -3.754 -3.845 -3.91 -0.0131
[1.308]*** [1.305]*** [1.306]*** [0.130]
Rymer (9) -3.811 -4.058 -4.221 -0.0721
[1.727]** [1.723]** [1.724]** [0.171]
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Evans (7) -3.815 -3.862 -3.904 -0.0185
[1.378]*** [1.375]*** [1.376]*** [0.136]
Henderson
(DC) -3.819 -3.921 -3.578 0.0306
[1.504]** [1.501]*** [1.517]** [0.151]
Riley (8) -3.892 -4.025 -4.09 -0.0223
[1.275]*** [1.273]*** [1.276]*** [0.127]
Arnold (8) -4.028 -4.081 -4.145 -0.00373
[1.323]*** [1.320]*** [1.323]*** [0.131]
Gregory (4) -4.072 -4.274 -4.361 -0.0542
[1.640]** [1.637]*** [1.637]*** [0.162]
Edmondson
(11) -4.078 -4.493 -4.576 -0.0333
[3.344] [3.337] [3.334] [0.331]
Smith (8) -4.08 -4.18 -4.279 -0.0199
[1.277]*** [1.275]*** [1.277]*** [0.127]
Dennis (5) -4.122 -4.08 -4.15 0.00593
[1.527]*** [1.524]*** [1.523]*** [0.151]
Bea (9) -4.166 -4.222 -4.264 -0.0112
[1.737]** [1.733]** [1.733]** [0.172]
Bye (8) -4.348 -4.509 -4.444 -0.0133
[1.285]*** [1.282]*** [1.283]*** [0.127]
Garza (5) -4.362 -4.332 -4.324 -0.00327
[1.420]*** [1.417]*** [1.422]*** [0.141]
Stewart (5) -4.417 -4.348 -4.301 0.0131
[1.464]*** [1.461]*** [1.462]*** [0.145]
Rogers (DC) -4.506 -4.58 -4.306 0.0309
[1.499]*** [1.496]*** [1.51 1]*** [0.150]
Callahan (9) -5.053 -5.133 -5.223 -0.0416
[1.737]*** [1.733]*** [1.733]*** [0.172]
Year 2005 -0.185 -0.232 -0.0658
[0.230] [0.230] [0.0228]***
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Year 2006 -1.495 -1.514 -0.222
[0.230]*** [0.230]*** [0.0228]***
Subject
Matter2 -1.919 -0.246
[1.433] [0.142]*
Subject
Matter3 0.129 0.0532
[1.128] [0.112]
Subject
Matter4 -0.0417 0.0418
[1.507] [0.149]
Subject
Matter5 1.243 0.142
[0.520]** [0.0516]***
Subject
Matter6 0.215 0.121
[0.851] [0.0844]
Subject
Matter7 1.875 0.368
[0.665]*** [0.0660]***
Subject
Matter8 0.718 0.154
[1.549] [0.154]
Subject
Matter9 0.119 0.0466
[0.840] [0.0833]
Subject
Matter 10 1.782 0.369
[1.210] [0.120]***
Subject
Matter 11 0.879 0.209
[0.593] [0.0589]***
Subject
Matterl 2 1.988 0.382
[0.932]** [0.0925]***
Subject
Matter 13 0.636 0.141
[0.557] [0.0553]**
Subject
Matter 14 0.564 0.11
[0.881] [0.0874]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Subject
Matterl 5 -0.544 -0.026
[0.614] [0.0609]
Subject
Matter 16 0.743 0.0865
[0.588] [0.0583]
Subject
Matterl 7 -0.683 -0.067
[1.183] [0.117]
Subject
Matterl 8 -0.849 -0.0783
[0.951] [0.0944]
Subject
Matter 19 -0.0995 -0.00151
[0.697] [0.0691]
Subject
Matter20 1.006 0.106
[0.641] [0.0636]*
Subject
Matter21 3.582 0.528
[0.980]*** [0.0972]***
Constant 5.978 6.635 5.892 -0.01
[1.057]*** [1.065]*** [1.174]*** [0.116]
N 11679 11679 11674 11674
R-sq 0.028 0.032 0.037 0.02
Standard errors
in brackets
*p< 0.10
**p < 0.05
***p< 0.01
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Table B. Law Review Citations per Case
Randolph (DC)
Birch (11)
Thomas (9)
Katzmann (2)
Wilkins (4)
Wesley (2)
Scirica (3)
Reinhardt (9)
Hull (11)
Fisher (9)
Schroeder (9)
Paez (9)
Ambro (3)
Sack (2)
5.675
[1.194]***
5.475
[1.260]***
3.945
[1.267]***
2.99
[1.395]**
2.958
[1.282]**
2.1
[1.407]
2.057
[1.475]
1.548
[1.149]
1.517
[1.460]
1.165
[1.184]
0.87
[1.446]
0.409
[1.332]
0.353
[1.107]
0.271
[1.166]
(2)
Law Reviews
5.559
[1.190]***
5.344
[1.255]***
3.75
[1.263]***
2.96
[1.390]**
2.737
[1.277]**
2.076
[1.401]
1.758
[1.469]
1.453
[1.145]
1.548
[1.454]
0.985
[1.180]
0.642
[1.440]
0.26
[1.327]
0.426
[1.103]
0.277
[1.162]
(3)
5.611
[1.184]***
5.411
[1.245]***
3.592
[1.252]***
2.525
[1.377]*
2.837
[1.265]**
2.076
[1.3881
1.58
[1.456]
1.622
[1.135]
1.688
[1.442]
1.008
[1.169]
0.1
[1.428]
0.357
[1.315]
0.635
[1.091]
0.215
[1.149]
(4)
Normalized
Law Reviews
-0.0114
[0.159]
-0.0175
[0.167]
-0.0556
[0.168]
-0.0843
[0.184]
-0.048
[0.170]
-0.0135
[0.186]
-0.0966
[0.195]
0.0125
[0.152]
0.0133
[0.193]
-0.0312
[0.157]
-0.128
[0.191]
-0.0116
[0.176]
0.0469
[0.146]
-0.0124
[0.154]
2012]
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Ginsburg (DC)
Sentelle (DC)
Straub (2)
King (5)
Luttig (4)
Anderson (11)
Sutton (6)
Cabranes (2)
Edmondson
(11)
Marcus (11)
Tjoflat (11)
Raggi (2)
Motz (4)
Wilkinson (4)
Calabresi (2)
Lipez (1)
0.244
[1.166]
0.22
[1.175]
0.209
[1.342]
0.138
[1.205]
0.0746
[1.240]
0.0643
[1.602]
0.0217
[1.126]
-0.0739
[1.097]
-0.2
[2.467]
-0.203
[1.200]
-0.275
[1.170]
-0.343
[1.282]
-0.4
[1.166]
-0.4
[1.134]
-0.442
[1.175]
-0.474
[1.006]
0.0729
[1.162]
0.0594
[1.171]
0.142
[1.337]
0.0195
[1.201]
-0.161
[1.236]
0.0154
[1.596]
0.0319
[1.122]
-0.22
[1.0941
-0.572
[2.459]
-0.159
[1.1951
-0.517
[1.1661
-0.477
[1.277]
-0.529
[1.162]
-0.504
[1.130]
-0.45
[1.1711
-0.553
[1.002]
0.581
[1.156]
0.688
[1.171]
0.135
[1.323]
0.15
[1.189]
-0.0869
[1.224]
-0.136
[1.580]
-0.1
[1.111]
-0.0279
[1.082]
-0.482
[2.433]
-0.0939
[1.190]
-0.294
[1.158]
-0.394
[1.264]
-0.637
[1.153]
-0.309
[1.119]
-0.288
[1.159]
-0.425
[0.992]
0.0559
[0.155]
0.0809
[0.157]
-0.019
[0.177]
-0.00312
[0.159]
-0.0335
[0.164]
-0.0344
[0.212]
-0.0231
[0.149]
-0.00743
[0.145]
-0.0647
[0.326]
0.00438
[0.159]
-0.0263
[0.155]
-0.0268
[0.169]
-0.0523
[0.155]
0.00723
[0.150]
0.026
[0.155]
0.00178
[0.133]
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McKeown (9)
Wardlaw (9)
O'Scannlain (9)
Smith (3)
Jones (5)
Wilson (11)
Fuentes (3)
Posner (7)
Barry (3)
Carnes (11)
Kleinfeld (9)
Clement (5)
Wiener (5)
Davis (5)
Michael (4)
Pregerson (9)
-0.491
[1.200]
-0.498
[1.297]
-0.502
[1.110]
-0.509
[1.342]
-0.543
[1.149]
-0.562
[1.446]
-0.563
[1.314]
-0.581
[0.899]
-0.638
[1.794]
-0.65
[1.170]
-0.716
[1.253]
-0.733
[1.134]
-0.739
[1.222]
-0.819
[1.222]
-0.873
[1.267]
-0.907
[1.175]
-0.55
[1.1951
-0.546
[1.2931
-0.526
[1.106]
-0.52
[1.3371
-0.719
[1.1451
-0.567
[1.440]
-0.517
[1.309]
-0.672
[0.8951
-0.466
[1.788]
-0.604
[1.166]
-0.868
[1.249]
-0.85
[1.1301
-0.85
[1.217]
-0.889
[1.217]
-1.002
[1.262]
-0.915
[1.171]
-1.302
[1.185]
-0.479
[1.281]
-0.667
[1.095]
-0.265
[1.323]
-0.728
[1.133]
-0.762
[1.430]
-0.465
[1.296]
-0.384
[0.887]
-0.111
[1.769]
-0.605
[1.156]
-1.071
[1.236]
-0.761
[1.118]
-0.569
[1.205]
-0.659
[1.207]
-0.817
[1.250]
-1.154
[1.160]
-0.125
[0.159]
0.0116
[0.172]
-0.0183
[0.147]
0.0384
[0.177]
-0.0448
[0.152]
-0.05
[0.192]
0.000937
[0.174]
0.0288
[0.119]
0.0976
[0.237]
-0.00965
[0.155]
-0.0611
[0.166]
-0.0146
[0.150]
0.0263
[0.161]
0.00993
[0.162]
0.00769
[0.168]
-0.0293
[0.155]
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Easterbrook (7)
Hawkins (9)
Batchelder (6)
Gibbons (6)
Shedd (4)
Cole (6)
Rogers (DC)
Dubina (11)
Fletcher (9)
Rendell (3)
Tallman (9)
Tacha (10)
Black (11)
Pooler (2)
Daughtrey (6)
Smith (5)
-0.933
[0.915]
-0.943
[1.475]
-0.949
[1.297]
-0.971
[1.180]
-0.981
[1.372]
-1.003
[1.166]
-1.018
[1.107]
-1.046
[1.323]
-1.049
[1.162]
-1.074
[1.342]
-1.083
[1.234]
-1.085
[1.166]
-1.09
[1.383]
-1.094
[1.170]
-1.097
[1.506]
-1.116
[1.040]
-1.035
[0.912]
-1.198
[1.469]
-1.026
[1.293]
-0.968
[1.175]
-1.107
[1.367]
-1.166
[1.162]
-1.09
[1.103]
-1.068
[1.318]
-1.228
[1.1581
-1.198
[1.3371
-1.328
[1.229]
-1.206
[1.162]
-1.188
[1.3781
-1.135
[1.166]
-1.101
[1.501]
-1.078
[1.036]
-0.83
[0.903]
-1.039
[1.456]
-1.042
[1.279]
-1.125
[1.163]
-0.89
[1.353]
-1.281
[1.150]
-0.564
[1.102]
-1.093
[1.305]
-1.629
[1.147]
-1.291
[1.324]
-1.469
[1.217]
-1.066
[1.151]
-1.123
[1.365]
-0.894
[1.154]
-1.02
[1.486]
-0.989
[1.026]
0.00521
[0.121]
-0.0281
[0.195]
-0.0251
[0.171]
-0.0276
[0.156]
0.00101
[0.181]
-0.0536
[0.154]
0.0771
[0.148]
-0.00119
[0.175]
-0.0896
[0.154]
-0.0326
[0.177]
-0.0719
[0.163]
-0.0168
[0.154]
0.000534
[0.183]
0.0357
[0.155]
0.0208
[0.199]
0.0167
[0.137]
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Higginbotham
(5)
Murphy (10)
Jacobs (2)
Boggs (6)
Selya (1)
Berzon (9)
Gould (9)
Cook (6)
Jolly (5)
Benavides (5)
Traxler (4)
Graber (9)
Wood (7)
Barkett (11)
Boudin (1)
Kozinski (9)
-1.137
[1.137]
-1.141
[1.134]
-1.211
[1.103]
-1.212
[1.184]
-1.223
[0.978]
-1.235
[1.120]
-1.235
[1.083]
-1.286
[1.362]
-1.373
[1.157]
-1.4
[1.126]
-1.4
[1.407]
-1.415
[1.200]
-1.461
[0.971]
-1.47
[1.253]
-1.494
[1.020]
-1.498
[1.228]
-1.084
[1.1331
-1.213
[1.130]
-1.228
[1.099]
-1.392
[1.180]
-1.355
[0.974]
-1.311
[1.1151
-1.377
[1.079]
-1.415
[1.357]
-1.547
[1.1531
-1.309
[1.122]
-1.489
[1.401]
-1.529
[1.1951
-1.563
[0.9681
-1.668
[1.249]
-1.581
[1.0161
-1.573
[1.223]
-0.786
[1.122]
-1.241
[1.120]
-1.228
[1.089]
-1.536
[1.169]
-1.243
[0.964]
-1.455
[1.104]
-1.529
[1.070]
-1.118
[1.343]
-1.314
[1.142]
-1.242
[1.111]
-1.726
[1.387]
-1.546
[1.183]
-1.328
[0.958]
-1.478
[1.236]
-1.501
[1.006]
-1.408
[1.211]
0.0547
[0.150]
-0.0302
[0.150]
0.00745
[0.146]
-0.0579
[0.157]
-0.00828
[0.129]
-0.0375
[0.148]
-0.0636
[0.143]
0.014
[0.180]
0.00384
[0.153]
0.0225
[0.149]
-0.0483
[0.186]
-0.0167
[0.159]
0.0137
[0.128]
-0.0088
[0.166]
-0.00609
[0.135]
0.00837
[0.162]
2012]
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King (4)
DeMoss (5)
Bybee (9)
Garza (5)
Williams (4)
Barksdale (5)
Niemeyer (4)
McConnell (10)
Rawlinson (9)
Rymer (9)
Henry (10)
Parker (2)
Lynch (1)
Martin (6)
Sloviter (3)
Clifton (9)
-1.514
[1.180]
-1.532
[1.153]
-1.558
[1.253]
-1.561
[1.048]
-1.576
[1.297]
-1.605
[1.362]
-1.608
[1.149]
-1.639
[1.038]
-1.65
[1.323]
-1.659
[1.274]
-1.666
[1.210]
-1.7
[1.234]
-1.726
[0.929]*
-1.745
[0.997]*
-1.746
[1.145]
-1.855
[1.362]
-1.577
[1.175]
-1.822
[1.149]
-1.546
[1.2481
-1.531
[1.044]
-1.533
[1.293]
-1.699
[1.3571
-1.69
[1.145]
-1.569
[1.0341
-1.909
[1.3181
-1.881
[1.270]
-1.847
[1.206]
-1.72
[1.229]
-1.858
[0.926]**
-1.848
[0.994]*
-1.87
[1.1411
-2.066
[1.3571
-1.68
[1.164]
-1.522
[1.139]
-1.704
[1.236]
-1.263
[1.037]
-1.168
[1.281]
-1.631
[1.345]
-1.677
[1.134]
-1.489
[1.025]
-2.345
[1.306]*
-2.221
[1.258]*
-1.875
[1.196]
-1.587
[1.217]
-1.715
[0.917]*
-1.825
[0.983]*
-1.703
[1.129]
-2.067
[1.343]
-0.0304
[0.156]
-0.0105
[0.153]
-0.0225
[0.166]
0.0328
[0.139]
0.0614
[0.172]
-0.0299
[0.180]
-0.00806
[0.152]
0.0156
[0.137]
-0.11
[0.175]
-0.0868
[0.169]
-0.0475
[0.160]
0.00934
[0.163]
0.00254
[0.123]
-0.0137
[0.132]
-0.00727
[0.151]
-0.0396
[0.180]
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Kelly (10)
Clay (6)
Moore (6)
Silverman (9)
Ripple (7)
Manion (7)
Loken (8)
Tymkovich (10)
Arnold (8)
Fisher (3)
Evans (7)
Lucero (10)
Garland (DC)
Murphy (8)
Stewart (5)
Duncan (4)
-1.866
[1.166]
-1.877
[1.012]*
-1.923
[1.054]*
-1.929
[1.490]
-1.983
[0.972]**
-1.986
[1.040]*
-1.987
[0.975]**
-2.007
[1. 107]*
-2.016
[0.976]**
-2.051
[1.372]
-2.082
[1.017]**
-2.172
[1.097]**
-2.178
[1.216]*
-2.23
[1.007]**
-2.257
[1.081]**
-2.271
[1.542]
-1.966
[1. 162]*
-1.885
[1.008]*
-1.866
[1.050]*
-2.139
[1.4851
-2.072
[0.969]**
-2.06
[1.036]**
-1.999
[0.972]**
-2.015
[1. 102]*
-2.072
[0.973]**
-1.876
[1.367]
-2.14
[1.013]**
-2.279
[1.093]**
-2.3
[1.212]*
-2.25
[1.004]**
-2.195
[1.077]**
-2.491
[1.5361
-1.755
[1.151]
-1.733
[0.998]*
-2.023
[1.040]*
-2.584
[1.470]*
-1.899
[0.961]**
-1.742
[1.027]*
-1.997
[0.963]**
-1.968
[1.092]*
-1.947
[0.966]**
-1.934
[1.353]
-1.947
[1.004]*
-2.083
[1.083]*
-1.63
[1.204]
-2.107
[0.995]**
-1.968
[1.067]*
-2.612
[1.521]*
0.0065
[0.154]
0.0121
[0.134]
-0.0193
[0.139]
-0.0952
[0.197]
-0.00146
[0.129]
0.0277
[0.138]
-0.00145
[0.129]
-0.00444
[0.146]
0.000588
[0.129]
0.0277
[0.181]
0.00995
[0.135]
0.000919
[0.145]
0.0871
[0.161]
0.00238
[0.133]
0.0474
[0.143]
-0.0542
[0.204]
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McKee (3) -2.272 -2.696 -2.515 -0.054
[1.332]* [1.328]** [1.314]* [0.176]
Gilman (6) -2.274 -2.271 -2.117 0.0184
[0.976]** [0.973]** [0.963]** [0.129]
O'Brien (10) -2.281 -2.231 -2.214 0.00113
[1.383]* [1.378] [1.366] [0.183]
Rogers (6) -2.282 -2.378 -2.385 -0.0201
[1.052]** [1.048]** [1.038]** [0.139]
Torruella (1) -2.333 -2.403 -2.321 -0.0107
[0.970]** [0.966]** [0.957]** [0.128]
Henderson (DC) -2.343 -2.443 -2.016 0.0648
[1.110]** [1.106]** [1.107]* [0.148]
Tatel (DC) -2.373 -2.573 -2.211 0.0305
[1.162]** [1.157]** [1.152]* [0.154]
Hartz (10) -2.416 -2.504 -2.355 0.0000778
[1.018]** [1.015]** [1.005]** [0.135]
Briscoe (10) -2.449 -2.502 -2.438 -0.00251
[1.134]** [1.130]** [1.119]** [0.150]
Williams (7) -2.456 -2.605 -2.267 0.0177
[1.025]** [1.022]** [1.012]** [0.136]
Colloton (8) -2.476 -2.486 -2.241 0.0271
[0.964]** [0.960]*** [0.952]** [0.128]
Rovner (7) -2.504 -2.689 -2.335 0.0126
[0.971]*** [0.968]*** [0.959]** [0.129]
Prado (5) -2.517 -2.613 -2.451 0.0133
[1.149]** [1.145]** [1.134]** [0.152]
Howard (1) -2.613 -2.667 -2.557 -0.0081
[1.029]** [1.025]*** [1.014]** [0.136]
Smith (8) -2.624 -2.712 -2.536 -0.00221
[0.943]*** [0.939]*** [0.931]*** [0.125]
Flaum (7) -2.662 -2.786 -2.47 0.0209
[0.993]*** [0.990]*** [0.982]** [0.132]
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Gregory (4) -2.666 -2.879 -2.69 -0.00819
[1.210]** [1.206]** [1.194]** [0.160]
Bye (8) -2.691 -2.826 -2.74 -0.015
[0.948]*** [0.945]*** [0.936]*** [0.125]
Kanne (7) -2.717 -2.793 -2.739 -0.0157
[0.948]*** [0.945]*** [0.936]*** [0.125]
Riley (8) -2.718 -2.85 -2.64 0.0049
[0.941]*** [0.938]*** [0.931]*** [0.125]
Wollman (8) -2.724 -2.792 -2.703 -0.00513
[0.965]*** [0.961]*** [0.953]*** [0.128]
Callahan (9) -2.758 -2.823 -2.916 -0.0185
[1.282]** [1.277]** [1.265]** [0.169]
Bea (9) -2.796 -2.792 -2.885 -0.00788
[1.282]** [1.277]** [1.265]** [0.169]
Melloy (8) -2.949 -3.062 -2.848 0.00827
[0.943]*** [0.940]*** [0.932]*** [0.125]
Dennis (5) -3.364 -3.367 -3.165 0.0295
[1.126]*** [1.123]*** [1.111]*** [0.149]
Year 2005 -0.524 -0.54 -0.0892
[0.169]*** [0.168]*** [0.0225]***
Year 2006 -1.552 -1.521 -0.289
[0.169]*** [0.168]*** [0.0225]***
SubjectMatter2 3.223 0.615
[1.045]*** [0.140]***
SubjectMatter3 1.495 0.379
[0.823]* [0.110]***
SubjectMatter4 3.911 0.734
[1.100]*** [0.147]***
SubjectMatter5 1.395 0.296
[0.380]*** [0.0509]***
SubjectMatter6 3.998 0.674
[0.621]*** [0.0832]***
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SubjectMatter7
SubjectMatter8
SubjectMatter9
SubjectMatter 10
SubjectMatterl I
SubjectMatter 12
SubjectMatter 13
SubjectMatter 14
SubjectMatter 15
SubjectMatter 16
SubjectMatter 17
SubjectMatter 18
SubjectMatter 19
SubjectMatter20
SubjectMatter21
Constant
N
1.13
[0.485]**
3.191
[1.130]***
2.984
[0.613]***
0.179
[0.883]
0.479
[0.433]
8.388
[0.680]***
0.637
[0.407]
1.36
[0.643]**
0.216
[0.448]
2.142
[0.429]***
-0.302
[0.863]
0.901
[0.694]
0.413
[0.508]
0.71
[0.468]
2.406
[0.715]***
3.824
[0.857]***
11674
0.231
[0.0650]***
0.49
[0.151]***
0.568
[0.0821]***
0.0643
[0.118]
0.109
[0.0580]*
1.214
[0.0911]***
0.124
[0.0545]**
0.29
[0.0861]***
0.0352
[0.0601]
0.317
[0.0575]***
-0.0106
[0.116]
0.187
[0.0930]**
0.105
[0.0681]
0.119
[0.0627]*
0.419
[0.0958]***
-0.106
[0.115]
11674
4.4
[0.780]***
11679
5.19
[0.785]***
11679
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R-sq 0.032 0.039 0.063 0.047
Standard errors
in brackets
*p <0.10
** p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
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APPENDIX B
SUBJECT-MATTER CODTNGS
Administrative Law-1
Review of agency decision making (not in another subject-matter category),
Administrative Procedure Act, Federal Communications Commission rates,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rates, Freedom of Information Act,
Social Security entitlement, and Medicare.
Campaign Finance-2
Campaign finance and any election-related issue.
Capital Punishment-3
Capital-punishment-related actions.
Church and State-4
Establishment Clause; Pledge of Allegiance; funding for private, religious
schools; prayer in school; Ten Commandments; etc.
Criminal*-5
Sentencing guidelines, prisoners' rights, drugs/controlled substances, attorney-
client privilege in criminal context, grand-jury-related, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations, search and seizure (Fourth Amendment), Prison
Litigation Reform Act, etc.
*Excludes capital punishment cases.
Environment-6
National Park Service; Clean Air Act; Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; Superfund; National Forest
Management Act; Endangered Species Act; Environmental Protection Act; etc.
Federal Business Law-7
Bankruptcy, antitrust, federal banking laws, unfair trade practices, Federal
Debt Collection Procedure Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Truth in
Lending Act, deceptive advertising under the Lanham Act, Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, etc.
Federalism-8
State rights, federal preemption, and Commerce Clause power.
First Amendment*-9
First Amendment-related issues.
*Excludes church and state issues.
Government Actions-10
Sovereign immunity, False Claims Act, and government forfeiture action.
Immigration-li
Immigration-related issues.
Intellectual Property-12
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Patents, copyright, trademarks, and Lanham Act (trademark-related actions).
Labor-13
Employment issues (excluding employment contractual disputes), Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, National Labor Relations Act, Occupational
Safety and Health Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, wrongful discharge, Labor-
Management Relations Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, employee
benefits, worker's compensation claims, retaliatory-discharge claims, etc.
Other-14
Indian law, maritime law, and implicit private rights of actions.
Private Law-15
Contracts, insurance, private arbitration, creditor v. debtor, lessor v. lessee,
usury laws, franchisee v. franchisor, employment contractual disputes,
corporate law, and piercing the corporate veil.
Rights*-16
Race discrimination, sex discrimination, affirmative action, civil rights, age
discrimination, privacy, abortion, other individual rights, and writs of habeas
corpus.
*Excludes employment and Eighth Amendment capital punishment.
Takings and Property-17
Takings claims, zoning issues, and property rights.
Tax-18
Internal Revenue Code and other tax-related matters.
Torts-19
Federal Tort Claims Act, medical malpractice, products liability, wrongful
death, libel, etc.
Courts-20
Cases in which the court's analysis is mostly or wholly absorbed with a
discussion of civil procedure. Focus is on issues relating to summary judgment,
removal, venue, etc.
Securities Law-21
Securities-related issues.
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